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Abstract. Decision trees are a frequently used form of representation especially in application 
areas in which efficiency is important. Despite this little is known about how they can be 
manipulated. This paper introduces identities for manipulating decision trees. Decision trees are 
interpreted to be terms of coalgebras and for this method of interpretation it is shown that the 
identities are complete. 
When decision trees are viewed as terms of an algebraic s:&em, it is reasonable to look for 
special forms into which these terms can be transformed. Not only do decision trees have a 
canonical form but also a number of other significant forms. These forms inc!ude the simply 
reduced form and the irreducible form. The former is useful in determining equality, while the 
latter is significant in the problem of optimizing decision trees. 
1. Introduction 
Decision trees are often employed to represent he taxonomy of problems and to 
drive classifying systems which utilize such descriptions. They are one of the simplest 
forms of representation and are particularly suited for representing discrete decisions 
based on a well-accepted rationale. As decision trees correspond directly to a 
computation, they also provide a very efficient way of implementing a decision 
This makes them an important form of representation in application areas, such as 
pattern recognition, where efficiency is important [8]. 
The fact that decision trees correspond to a computation so closely has led authors 
to characterize them as being models of computation [13]. The simplicity of this 
characterization is very attractive. However, it has serious shortcomings, for when 
a decision tree is being used to represent knowledge it displays a no less important 
facet. While it may be no surprise to learn that a model for computation contains 
knowledge, for knowledge to be useful it must be malleable. Simply regardi 
decision trees as a specification of a computation does not, a priori, make it malleab 
In fact, the converse is true: it casts decision trees in iron. 
In an interactive system, for example, it is co 
that the user does not know how to answer a cl 
ed. Encoding all this a 
y loses any parsi underlying decision may have 
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had_ Indeed, anticipating every whim of a user, in this manner, would result in a 
gigantic and bushy tree. Clearly, this approach is untenable for much the same 
reason that approaching a chess-playing program by attempting to precompute very 
game is untenable. 
Obviously, what is lacking is the ability to use the decision tree representation as 
a deep source of knowledge, rather than a surface description of the flow of control. 
CI, simple example, in which a modification of the surface flow of control is required, 
arises when it is necessary to evade a decision to which the user (or a subsystem) 
is unable to provide a resolution. To perform such feats and yet maintain the overall 
integrity of the system, it is essential to be able to manipulate the representation 
and guarantee semantic equivalence. 
For decision trees this has been a conceptual stumbling block. While the 
equivalence of decision trees in the presence of an interpretation or semantics (be 
it given by examples or rules) is understood, their equivalence as abstract entities 
in their own right has not been well understood. 
Perhaps the all too obvious computational semantics obscured the possibility that 
decision trees might have an interesting syntactic calculus. If this was the reason, 
it is unfortunate as a purely semantic view of a phenomenon often inhibits the 
development of certain types of insights which arise more naturally from a syntactic 
view. Indeed, an important motivation in the introduction of a syntactic calculus 
is precisely that such an approach often brings to light manipulcltions which are 
more incisive or effic.ent than those derived purely from the semantics. 
A modest example of this arises when studying algorithms for establishing the 
equality of decision expressions (see Section 4 below). If the semantics is used in 
the most obvious way (checking that they give an evaluation of the same function), 
then the algorithm is exponential on the number of variables (decisions). However, 
if the syntactic approach (see Proposition 4.13) is used, then the solution is bilinear 
on the size of the terms. In the worst case, of course, the size of the terms can be 
exponential on the number of variables as the basic complexity cannot be dodged. 
However, this does not belittle the achievement as, in practice, ‘full’ decision 
expressions, at which this complexity bound is reached, are unusual. Thus, this 
syntactic algorithm gives much tighter and more practical bounds on the complexity 
of the problem. 
An important consideration in pattern recognition applications, and also, though 
to a lesser degree, in interactive systems, is the efficiency of the decision process. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the subject of decision tree optimization has been studied 
quite extensively [13]. The problem is known to be NP-complete [ 111. While they 
often have an alarming propensity for providing arbitrarily bad answers, many 
heuristics for finding suboptimal solutions have been developed. For example, a 
common (and fairly successful) heuristic is to grade the decisions, according to 
1 or ertropy [ 161, and to place the decisions with the highest valu,s 2~:. 
ents of optimization are stymied by the lack of a calculus 
cision trees. For optimization they rely most!y on general 
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search techniques (dynamic programming [ 11, branch and bound [IZ], etc.) and 
often do not take full advantage of the structure inherent in the situation. ‘Ihe effect 
of having a calculus available is really quite dramatic and has led to the discovery 
of irreducible trees, introduced in Section 5 below. 
The relationship between pure decision trees and program control structures is 
very similar to that between boolean algebra and predicate logic. Thus, solving 
optimization problems for decision trees also solves, in part, the more general 
problems of code optimization. An irreducible tree is the analogue of a prime 
implicand in logic. In particular, the property of being irreducible is purely syntactic. 
This has the very important consequence that it becomes possible to perform 
optimization in the absence of any explicit cost function. Clearly, to optimize an 
arbitrary section of program code, this ability is essential, as a detailed cost function 
will rarely be available. 
The possibility of regarding decision trees as abstract representations of decisions, 
as opposed to computations, also suggests areexamination of their use for knowledge 
representation. For once a calculus of manipulations is available, the unstructured 
aspects of an interaction can be handled by manipulations to dynamically mold the 
decision process to the requirements of a user. It is then possible to develop very 
flexible interactive systems based on this decision expression methodology. An 
interesting advantage of this approach concerns the elimination of the control 
problem which irks rule-based systems (see [6]). 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the theory of discrete decisions An 
important component of this theory is, of course, a calculus of manipulations. 
Crucial to this development is the interpretation of decision trees as terms of 
coalgebras. This interpretation allows decision trees to be manipulated by algebraic 
rules and yet to have a very natural semantics. If the trees are interpreted algebrai- 
cally, the algebras bear little resemblance to the computational intuition (see [2] 
and the diagonal operators in [ 151 j, and this mismatch may well have contributed 
to blocking researchers from methodically exploiting the calculus described below. 
A coalgebraic theory is the formal dual of an algebraic theory. While the duality 
provides a symmetry which allows the adoption of a similar notation and data- 
structures, there are also fundamental differences between algebras and coalgebras 
[a]. In particular, the problem of showing that the manipulations are complete is 
no longer a simple consequence of the existence of free algebras (as these models 
may not be coalgebras). Instead, a coalgebra which exercises 
completely must be exhibited. Such a coalgebra is described i 
the paper. 
the manipulations 
the final section of 
decision theory is an e one ajar erence: its dS, 
instead of being algebras, are coalgebras. This means that instead of its function 
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symbols being interpreted as operations they are interpreted as cooperatjons. A..tese 
are the formal dual of operations. Thus, while an operation is a map from a (Cartesian) 
product to base set, 
f:A x . . . x A+A, 
a cooperation is a map from the base set to the coproduct (or disjoint union), 
g:A+A+---+A. 
Intuitively, a cooperation splits an object, A, into different buckets. The copy 
number of the bucket into which an element falls may be regarded as classification 
information. However, there is also the possibility that when the elements are placed 
in one of these buckets, they are twisted by some endomorphism of A. 
The fact that cooperations are dual to operations implies that the basic methods 
of manipulation are analogous. That is, the usual technique of writing down 
equational terms using variables will work for cooperations. However, it is necessary 
to distinguish coalgebraic expressions from algebraic expressions in some way and 
in this paper the following method is used: for operations we shall use postfix 
notation, 
(X I,---, X”) .A 
while for cooperations we shall use prefix notation and a different separator between 
the arguments (conceptually G comma upside down), 
g. (x,’ . . . ‘x,,). 
There remains the problem of how to interpret a composite coalgebraic term. For 
example, consider the expression, 
where go, g, and g2: A+ A+ A. From what and to what is this a map? One difficulty 
in trying to interpret this expression arises as, while the underlying tree has five 
leaves, there are only three variables. It is much easier to see how to interpret the 
expression 
go -(81 l (Yl'YJ'& - (81 l (Y3'YJY5)) 
by composing the maps: 
A+QA+_4+ 1 R+gz(A+A)+(A+A)+i+(Kl+i)(A+A)+((A+A)+A) 
where i is an identity map and g, + g2 is the component-wise map. To obtain the 
interpretation of the origilnal expression, it only remains to identify the buckets 
ich have been given the same names: 
((b,‘b,)‘((b2’b3)‘b3)): (A+ 
where bi stands for t 
algebraic expressions. 
+A)+A)+d=tA+A 
n the c&joint union. 
Discrete decision theory: manipulafion 219 
The choice of notation has been made to be consistent with the categorical notation 
of [4]. 
There is an important context in which cooperations arise. Suppose we are given 
two maps 
tr:A+A and at:A+Inl, 
where InI stands for the standard 
(tr,at):A+A x Inl. 
The object A x I nl is canonically 
c,,:A x In(+A+---+A 
making (tr, at). c,, a cooperation. 
set of n elements; then this gives a map 
isomorphic to the n-fold disjoint union of A, 
The map at should be regarded as an attribute map, while the map tr should be 
regarded as a twisting endomorphism. If the endomorphism tr is the identity, then 
the resulting cooperation is a decision. A decision is a cooperation concerned only 
with classification, thus there is no twisting. This shows a correspondence between 
decisions and attribute maps. This correspondence is described more formally in 
[4], but its import is readily apparent: whenever there is a system of attributes 
present, there is also a system of decisions. 
In fact, decisions and attribute maps correspond precisely. Thus, given a collection 
of decisions, there is a corresponding attribute system as well. Attribute systems 
and decision theories may be regarded as being two representations of the same 
phenomenon. 
An important way in which decision trees (or terms of a decision theory) may 
be used is to represent a functional relationship between attributes. Thus, if for an 
animal the status of being a mammal or not depends on whether it suckles its young 
or has hair, then we may write an identity of decision trees to express this: 
mammal. (YES’NO) = suckle. (YES’hafr . (YES’NO)) 
where the first argument implies a positive response. A more convenient notation, 
when the decisions are derived from attributes as above, should allow the names 
of the attributes to be associated with the branches. For this reason, it is useful to 
introduce an alternative syntax which has this property. In the IXXI~E system 
[9], the following syntax was adopted for representing these terms: 
(1) suckle:[yes % YES, no % hair:[yes % YES, no a N 
‘ons thus resemble the ‘case’ state 
is branching structure of a progra 
and decision theories are obviously closely related to this structure. 
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rather obvious that the decision of whether an animal is a mammal or not 
expressed in various different ways, for example, 
(2) hair:[yes * YES, suckle:[yes > YES, no * NO]], 
(3) suckle:[yes % hair:[yes > YES, no % YES], 
no * hair:[yes * YES, no * No]], 
suckle:[yes > YES 
uckle:[yes * YES, no 
(5) hair:[yes Z+ hair:[yes Z+ YES, no Z+ NO], 
no * suckle:[yes Z+ YES, no Z+ NO]]. 
It is easy to check that these are all equivalent from an understanding of the 
classification problem. In fact, as will become clear in Section 3, these decision 
expressions are equivalent no matter what t ey represent. It is also clear that (3), (4) 
and (5) are rather inefficient and unlike1 r to be chosen as a form in which to realize 
this decision. There are various ‘sensible’ forms, of varying degrees of sophistication, 
in which a decision can be given and these are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
Suppose the decision of whether the animal is a mammal is presented as in (1). 
In order to evaluate this tree, it is necessary to know the answer to whether the 
animal suckles its young. Simply that it is not currently stickling would not justify 
a negative answer while a positive answer may require an observation which has 
not been made. Thus it is possible that the information to make this decision is 
simply not available. 
Of course, for this example, it is not necessary to have this information as (2) 
shows. Thus, the knowledge that the decision tree has other equiva!ent forms, in 
the sense of representing the same decision, can be rather useful in avoiding decisions 
which, for one reason or another, cannot be made (as was discussed in the 
introduction). 
Although this example is simple, it does illustrate why it may bL desirable to be 
able to manipulate decisions into different but equivalent forms. Perhaps one of the 
principal reasons that decision trees have been generally ignored as a significant 
form for representing knowledge is the lack of an accepted calculllc of manipulations. 
This is precisely what this paper provides. 
3. 
The reader is now asked :J> believe that the correct formulation of a decision tree 
is as a term of a coalgebraic theory. Manipulations of decision trees should then 
be the result of t e varietal identities of this theory. The purpose 
of this section is to show that t basic anipulations of 
aine 
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It is necessary, at the outset, to define more precisely the form of the coalgebraic 
theories for which decision trees are terms. The full justification for this definition 
will have to wait until there is sufficient machinery present o prove the completeness 
of the formulation (see Section 6 below). In the meantime, one should at least note 
how these formal objects have rather similar properties to those one might expect 
from decision trees. 
nitisn 3,l. A decision theory D = (0, E) consists of set Q of cooperation symbols 
and a set E of identities. Each q c Q has an a&y, arity(q) = 2,3,. . . , associated 
with it. The identities of E are of the form t, = f2 where tl and t2 are terms of 0, 
where the terms of the decision theory are defined recursively by 
(i) there is a stock of variables x, , x2, . . . , each of which is a term; 
(ii) if tl, . . . , t, are terms and q is a cooperation symbol of arity n, then 
q. (t,’ . . . ‘t,) is a term. 
Every decision theory must satisfy the following identities for every q, ql, q2 E Q: 
[D.l] 4.(x’... ‘x) = x (idempotence); 
CD.21 q1 _ (x,’ . . . ‘xr_,‘q2 . (y,’ . . . ‘y”)’ . . . ‘x,) 
= q2 . (q1 . (x,’ . . . IX’--,‘y,‘xr+*’ . . . lx,)‘. . . ’ 
q1 l (x,’ - . . ‘x~_,~L’x~+, . . . ‘x,)) 
(distribution); 
[D.3] q. (x,’ . . . ‘xr_, , q . (y,’ . . . ‘ym)‘xr+,’ . . . ‘x,) 
= q . (x,’ . . . ‘X’_-,‘y”X’+ ,’ . . . ‘x,) (repetition). 
A model of a decision theory D = (Q, E) is a coalgebra, called a decision coalgebra. 
Coalgebras are precisely the dual notion to algebras. Thus, a decision coalgebra 
consists of a base set A with each cooperation symbol of Q interpreted as a 
cooperation on A of appropriate arity. Furthermore the identities [ D.l]-[ D.31 and 
those in E must be satisfied by this interpretation. A morphism of coalgebras is 
then a map between base objects which commutes with each cooperation in the 
obvious manner. These coalgebras are easily seen to form a category. 
A decision coalgebra must always satisfy the identities [D.l]-[ D.3]. Sometimes, 
in addition, there will be further identities E which are satisfied. In this paper, we 
shall be concerned exclusively with the effect of the identities [ 4-cw o* the 
system and we shall show that all the intuitive facts about decision trees are true 
for decision theories satisfying these identities. 
The first result tells us that if every cooperation sa 
term of the theory does as well. Thus, these identitie 
scheme which ap 
subvariety of theories. 
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A notational convenience is to denote a term w by w . (x,’ . . . ‘x,,), where X, , . . . , x, 
are the variables of the term. Substitution can then be indicated by the replacement 
of the appropriate argument. 
3.2. If w, and w2 
0 i w,.(x’x’...‘x)=x 
are terms in a decision theory D = (Q, E ), then 
( idempotence for terms ); 
( ) ii w, . (x,’ * . . ‘x,_ ,‘Wz . (y,’ . . . ‘y,)‘xr+,’ . . . ‘x,) 
= w2 . (w, . (x,’ . . . ‘xr-,‘y,‘xr+,’ l . . IX”)’ . . . ’ 
w, . (x,‘. . . ‘xr-,‘y’/xr+,‘. . . ‘x,)) 
(distributiuity for terms); 
(iii) w.(x,‘... ‘X’_,‘W . (y,’ . . . ‘y,J’xr+,’ . . . ‘x,> 
= w. (x,’ . . . ‘xr_,‘y’.‘xr+,’ . . . ‘x,,) (repetition for terms). 
roof. (i): Using induction on the height of the term. If w1 has height 0, then it is 
a variable; if it has height 1, it is an expression of the form q . (x’ . . . ‘x) where q is 
in Q. Thus the result holds. Suppose now the result holds for expressions of height 
less than or equal to n. Suppose w is an expression of height n + 1; then w . (x’ . . . ‘x) = 
q.(w,.(x’...‘x)‘...‘w,.(x”... ‘x)) where q E Q and each M+ for r = 1, . . . , m has 
height less than or equal to n. As idempotence holds for the subexpressions we have 
q.(w,.(x’...‘x)‘...‘w,.(x’...‘x))=q.(x’...’x) 
and now, as q is idempotent, this equals X, so that the induction step is completed. 
(ii): Again, we use induction on the height of the terms wl and w2. If each term 
has height 1, then the distributive law provides the result. Suppose now that w, has 
height N + 1 and w2 has height 1; also suppose the result holds for w2 of height 1 
a.nd w, of height less than or equal to N. Then 
w,., , . . . lx ’ ‘w, . (y,’ . . . ‘y*)’ . . . ‘x,,) 
= q. (WI*, . (Xl’. . . ‘w2. (y,’ . . . ‘y,)’ . . . ‘X’J’ . . . ’ 
w,,, . ( x,’ . . . ‘W?. (y,‘. . . ‘yJ.. . ‘X”)) 
where each w,,~~ for i = !, . . . , ty has height less than or equal to N. Thus, by induction 
(height w2 is 1) we may distribute 
=4. (w2. (wi,, .(x1’. . . ‘y,‘. . . ‘x,,j’. . . ‘w,,~. (xl’. . . “y,‘. . . ‘x,jj” 
. . . ‘W2 l (WI,, e (Xl’ l l l ‘yi’ * l l ‘X), . l . , WI , . (Xl’ l s l ‘ym’. . l ‘X,))) . 
using the distributive law again we may distribute the W? forward from the first place: ,- 
= w2 . (q l (w,,, . (X,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘XJ3W~ , (W,,? . (x,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘x,,)’ 
. . . ‘W,,? . (x,’ * . . ‘y,,,’ . . . Ix,))’ 
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. . . ‘w* l (Iv,,, . (x,‘. . . ‘y,‘. . . ‘x/J’. . . ‘W,,, . (Xl’. . . ‘y,‘. . . ‘x/J))’ 
. . . ‘q. (w,,, l (x,’ . . l 'y,' . . . ‘x,*)‘w* . (Iv,,2 . (x,’ . . . ‘y1’ . . . ‘X”}’ 
. . . ‘W,,J . (x,’ l . . ‘y,,’ . . . ‘x,))’ 
. . . ‘w2 . (W,,, . (x,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘x/J’ . . . ‘W,,, l (x,’ . . . ‘ym’ . . . ‘x,,))))). 
Bringing w2 out from the second argument of q results in an expression of the form 
w2. (w, . (q. (w,,* . (x,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘x,), W,,J . (x,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘x,,)’ 
. . . ‘w2. (w,,, . (x,’ . . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘x,,)’ . . . ‘w,,, . (x,’ . . . ‘ym’ . . * ‘x,))’ . . . . 
Using repetition we may eliminate the double occurrence of w2 so that effectively 
we have removed the inner occurrence of w2. This may be done for each inner 
occurrence of w2 leaving the appropriate argument only: 
= w2 .(q.(w,,, .(x,‘. . .‘y,‘. . . ‘x,)‘. . . ‘w I,,. (x,‘. . .‘y*‘. . .‘X”))’ 
. . . ‘q.(w,,, .(x,‘. . .‘y,‘. . .‘x’J’. . .‘W,,‘.(X,‘. . .‘y,‘. . .‘x,))). 
This provides the induction step required. 
Thus far, provided w2 has height 1, the result holds. So now suppose it has height 
A4 + 1 and the result holds for all lesser height. 
w, l (Xl’. . . ‘xr_,‘w2 . (y,’ . . . ‘y,)’ . . . ‘x/J 
=wp(x,‘... ‘x,_,‘q( wz,, . (y,’ . . . ‘yJ . . . ’ WZ,, . (y,’ . . . ‘ym))’ . . . ‘x,) 
where w2.i. (y,’ . . . ‘ym) all have heights less than M + 1. Distributing q forward gives 
= q . (w, . (x,’ . . . ‘Xr_,‘W2,, . (y,’ . . . ‘y,)’ . . . ‘x,,)’ . . . ’ 
w, . (x,’ . . . ‘xr-,‘w2., . (y,’ . . . ‘y’),) ’ . . . ‘x,,)). 
By the induction hypothesis the w2.i may now be distributed forward: 
= q* (w2.1 l (w, . (x,‘. . . 'y,'. . ‘x/J’. . . ‘w, . (Xl’. . . ‘y,‘. . . ‘x,,))‘. . .’ 
W2,, l (WI . (Xl’. . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘X”)’ . . . ’ w, . (Xl’. . . ‘y,’ . . . ‘X’J)) 
which provides the result. 
(iii): Work by induction on the height of w. For height 1 the result is clear. 
Suppose the result holds for height IV or less and consider w of depth N + 1 and 
w.(x*‘... ‘x,> = q. (w, . (xl’. . . ‘x,) . . . ‘w, . (x,’ . . . ‘xJ); then 
w . (x,’ . . . ‘w . (y,’ . . . jJ*)’ . . . ‘x,) 
may be written as 
q. (H i . (x,’ . . * ‘q. (w, . (y,’ . . . ‘y,*> . . . IMY,. (VI’ . . . ‘y,,))’ . . . ‘x,)’ . . . ’ 
w, , (x,’ . . . ‘q. (w,(yl’ . . . ‘;,,,>’ . , . ‘lz’, . (jli’ . . . ‘Y .!l’ : _ : ‘x;;)). , r,,, 
se the following le 
expression manipulation. 
e a fuPdaiW%lta ecision 
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mma 3.3 (the Repeat Reduction Lemma). If D = ( Qv E) is Q decision theory with 
q E Q and w is a term, then 
q. (x,’ .. . ‘Xr_I’W. (y1’. . . ‘ys_l’q. (2,‘. . . ‘Z’J’ . . . ‘y’J . . . ‘x,) 
= q. (x,‘* .. ‘X&‘W. (y1’. . . ‘y&, . . . ‘ym)’ . . . ‘x,). 
Proof. Distribute q in front of w using (ii) above. This gives 
9.(x1’... ‘x&q. (w . (y,’ . . . ‘ys_&’ . . . ‘y’J’ . . . ’ 
w. (y1’. . . ‘ys-*‘zn’ l . . ‘ym))’ . . . ‘x,). 
Now, use repetition. 0 
f of Proposition 3.2(iii) (continued). Apply Lemma 3.3 to obtain 
q.(w,.(x,‘...‘q.(...)‘...‘x”)‘...’w,.(x,’...’q.(...)‘...‘x”)) 
=q.(w,.(x*‘...‘w,.(ylf...‘y,)‘..*’x,)’...’ 
wt. (x,’ . . . ‘w, . (y1’. . . ‘y”)‘. . . ‘x,)). 
Now the induction hypothesis may be used to obtain 
cl 
The results gives us more confidence in the axiom scheme [ D.l]-[ D.31 as they 
do provide the sort of results our intuition of decision trees leads us to expect. In 
particular, the Repeat Reduction Lemma says that once a decision has been taken, 
if it occurs again later in the decision process, it will be taken the same way again. 
It should be emphasized that Proposition 3.2 is a very special result (consider 
the composite Abelian group operation x + y a -Lx: is it still commutative?). It is also 
very useful, for it allows one to treat a composite decision exactly like a single 
decision (as in Lemma 3.3). Most significantly, it is precisely what is required to 
have a sensible subroutine system, for the subroutines (composite expressions) can 
be treated as black boxes and yet be manipulated s simple decisions. 
A further identity (due to Chen and Ras [3]) is transposition: 
CD.43 qr . (42 l (x,,,’ . . . ‘xl .)’ . . . ‘q2 . (x,, ,’ e . . ‘?c, n)) * 9 . 
= 92 l (9, * (x,.1’ l l l ‘xm,,)’ l - l ‘q, l (x,,,,’ l l l ‘x*,‘J). 
The identity is implied by [D.l]-[ D.31 and may be regarded as providing an 
alternative method of stating the basic axioms of decision theories. The interdepen- 
dence of these identities is given by the following lemma. 
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roof. (i): Starting with q1 . (q2. (+ . . . ‘x&’ . . . ‘q2. (+’ . . . ‘x,.,)) and distribut- 
ing the first q2 forward gives 
q2 l (41 l (x*,*‘q2 l (x2,1’ l l l ‘X2,n)’ l l J l l l ‘q, l (X,/q2 . (X2,*‘. . . ‘x2J’ . . .)), 
now use Lemma 3.3 to obtain the RI-IS of [D.4]. 
(ii): ql . (x,’ . . . ’ x,-,‘q2 . (yl’ . . . ‘y,,,)’ . . . ‘x,) using identity [D.l] equals 
ql . (42 . (xl’ . . . ‘Xl)’ . . . $2 . (.lt,+’ . . . ‘xF-J’q2 . (yl’ . . . ‘ym)’ . . .); using transposition 
this gives the RHS of [D-2]. Cl 
Thus, the identity [D-2] can be replaced by [D-4] to obtain an equivalent heory 
with a slightly different representation. 
Corollary 3.5. Given any two terms wl, w2 in a decision theory, it holds that 
Proof, 
The 
WI. (w,. (x1,1’. . ‘X,J’. . . ‘w2. (X,,l’. . . ‘X”,,)) 
= w2. (w, . (Xl,,‘. . . ‘x&‘. . . ‘WI . (Xl,/. . . ‘X”,,)). 
Apply Lemma 3.4(i) and then Proposition 3.2. Cl 
importance of transposition to the problem of optimization will be discussed 
in Section 5. 
4. Equality and forms 
The terms of a decision theory can be used as interaction schemes, for performing 
an efficient classification in a pattern recognition application, or as a structure, for 
holding database information. The question of when two interactions, classifications, 
or databases are equivalent is clearly of some importance. In this section, algorithms 
for determining equality are discussed, together with some forms which are useful 
in this determination. 
Decision expressions actually have a r.ormal form, thus one way of establishing 
equality is to transform the expressions into that normal form. In practice this can 
be an expensive way of determining equality and so alternative approaches are 
introduced. As the normal form for decision expressions is a useful tool for establish- 
ing results, the first part of this section develops the concepts behind this normal form. 
In order to elucidate the properties of decision theories, it is useful to know about 
the retrieval properties of terms. To this end it is necessary to introduce some notation. 
The notation q 0 a, called a branch instruction, means that the ath argumen, of 
q must be followed when q is’ encountered. A path in a decision tree which starts 
at the root is totally determined by the list of branch instructions it follows: such 
a path is called a root path, an isr [q, 0 a,, . . . , qn 0 &I. 
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nition .l. (i) A spine in a term t is a pair p(P, x) where P = 
Cq,Oa,,**-9 q,, 0 a,] is a root path in t which leads to a leaf uc which the variable 
x sits. Sp( t) is the set of spines of t. 
(ii) If E is a conjunct 
q1 0 a1 & l l l & qn 0 a,, 
then a root path P is said to agree with E if whenever q 0 x and q 0 y are in either 
the root path P or the conjunct E, then x = y. 
(iii) If t is a term and E is a conjunct as above, then the retrieval of E in t is 
Ret( E, t) = {xlp( P, x) E Sp( t) and P agrees with E}. 
Notice that the -bay that (ii) has been stated means that conjunctions which are 
contradictions never agree with any root path. Similarly, paths with a repeated 
decision, for which different branch instructions have been used, agree with no 
conjunctions. 
When decision expressions are used to hold database items (see [3]), the retrieval 
of conjunctive inquiries is provided by Ret( E, t). The retrieval of arbitrary (proposi- 
tional) queries is given by expressing the query as a disjunct of conjuncts and 
unioning the results of the retrievals on the conjunsts. 
Then 
.2. For example, consider the term 
t = 41 l (q2 l (~I’~Z)‘QZ l (!I3 l (Xl’Xd’%))~ 
(i) RethO l&q302,t)=h~41, 
(ii) Ret(ql 0 2 & q3 0 2, t) =(x3, x4}. 
1ne following result brings out a further significant aspect of the identities 
[D.l]-[D.3]. 
trieval Lemma). If t, and t2 are terms of Q decision theory which 
are [ D.l]-[ D.31 equivalent and E is a conjunction of decisions, then Ret( E, t,) = 
Ret{ E, t2). 
ces to check that each of [D.l]-[D.3] preserve the equality. In fact, 
it is convenient to replace [D-2] by [ D.41 as the latter rule clearly does not affect 
s and so certainly will not alter the retrieval. This leaves [D-l] and CD.31 
Notice that CD.31 does not alter the set of consistent paths. This means that it 
does not affect the retrieval. 
inally for [D.l], introducing a cooperation using idempotence does not affect 
the outcomes of the paths after or before the cooperation. Thus, whatever decision 
e introduced cooperation, the var able retrieval is unaffected. 0 
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nitio Let D = (Q, { }) be a finite decision 
let < be a to&l ordering on the cooperation of I?: 
theory (that is, 1 Ql is finite) and 
41<q2<* l l <qn; 
then a term t of D is said to 
path in which every q occurs 
be in full normal form if every spine of t has a root 
precisely once and in the order given by <. 
If D = ({ql, q2}, { }) and the total ordering is q1 c q2, then 
(i) q1 . ( q2 . (x1’x2)‘q2 . (x3’x1)) is in normal form; 
(ii) q1 . (xl’q2. (x2’x3)) is not in normal form as q2 does not occur in the leftmost 
path; 
(iii) q2 . (xl’ql . (~3~)) is not in normal form as q1 occurs after q2 in the rightmost 
path and does not occur at all in the leftmost path. 
The justification for calling this a normal form is given by the following propo- 
sition. 
Proposition 4.6. If D is a finite decision theory with no identities and a total ordering 
< on its cooperations, theta : 
(i) every term t of D is decision equivalent o a term in full normal form, full(t); 
(ii) if tl and t2 are terms of D which are equivalent, then full( t,) and full( t2) are 
the sCrme xpression, that is, full! tJ = full( t2). 
The notation “=” means ‘is structurally exactly the same expression as’, while 
46 = d ” will mean that the terms are equivalent using [D.l]-[D.3], in other words 
decision equivalent. If P is a root path, by &P will be denoted the conjunct formed 
from its branch instructions 
roof. (i): Construct a tree, all of whose cooperations at height n + 1 are the nth 
cooperation in the total ordering T. At each leaf of this tree place a copy of t. By 
idempotence (and Proposition 3.2), this term equals t. However, using the Repeat 
Reduction Lemma, the second repetition of any cooperation can be eliminated. At 
each leaf of the constructed tree this reduces the copy of t to a variable. This 
provides an expression in full normal form equivalent to t. 
(ii): If t1 =d f2, then their normal forms full( tJ and full( t2) are [D.l]-ED.31 
equivalent. If full( t,) is not the same expression as full( t2), then, at sope leaf defined 
by a path P, Ret(&P, full( t,)) # Ret(&P, full( t2)). This contradicts the Retrieval 
Lemma showing that they must be the same expressions. Cl 
The normal form of a term t will be denoted full(t). In 
form it was necessary to restrict attention to finite decisio 
produce a similar normal form for decision theories with i~~~itely 
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the extra work to introduce the concepts does not seem worthwhile. A proof that 
any two decision expressions are equal is always contained in a finite theory. Thus, 
equality in an infinite theory occurs only when equality occurs in a finite subtheory. 
(Retrieval Completeness of [ D.l]-[ D.31). Every retrieval on t, and t2 
is the same if and only if tl is decision equivalent o t2. 
Thus, the retrieval properties characterize terms. Conversely the axioms [D.I]- 
[D.3] determine precisely the manipulations which are allowed while preserving 
the retrieval properties of a term. These observations are fundamental to using terms 
of decision theories as structures in which database information is stored. 
This also gives the two methods of deciding equality. First, convert the terms into 
full normal form. Second, check whether their retrieval properties are the same. 
The latter method is impractical as it stands, as the set of possible retrievals is large. 
The importance of normal forms is as a theoretical tool for obtaining results, as 
a conversion to normal form can be a costly operation. Determining equality by 
performing two such conversions is not the best approach. A more elegant approach 
is given by a refinement of the second approach mentioned above. 
Proposition 4.8. Given terms t, and t_ for every spine p( P, x) in tl , Ret(& P, t2) = {x} 
if and 0nZy if tl =d t2. 
roof. Clearly, as Ret&P, tl) = {x}, if t, cd t2, then, by the Retrieval Lemma, 
Ret(&P, tJ = {x}. Conversely, suppose t, is not decision equivalent to t2; then 
full( t,) # full( t2) whence there is a C~IU& ---=tpnt path P in fuIl( tl) with 
{x,} = Ret(&P, full( t,)) = Ret(&P, t,) f Ret(&P, full( tZ)) 
= Ret(&P, t2) = {x,} 
where each retrieval is a single variable. There is clearly only one spine of tl whose 
root path agrees with &l? If p(R, x,) is this spine, then 
{x,} = Ret(&R, t,) = Ret&R, full( t,)). 
Now &R agrees with P, so is a shorter conjunction than l? Thus, 
Ret(&R, tz) r, Ret(&P, tJ = {x2}. 
Thus, 
Ret(&R, tz) # Ret&R, t,). q 
This gives a significantly improved test for equality. 
A rather different way to approach methods of determining equality is to exploit 
e rewritings introduced by the Repeat Reduction Lemma and the idempotence 
es a very elegant algorith for determining equality w 
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It is obvious that, given any decision expression, there is a unique expression 
which results from applying the Repeat Reduction Lemma, in the direction of 
removing decisions until it no longer applies. While it is true that two expressions 
which reduce in this manner to the same expression are equal, it is not the case 
that if two expressions are decision equivalent, they can be reduced in this manner 
to the same expression. 
.9. A term of a decision theory is said to be in repeat reduced form if 
the Repeat Reduction Lemma cannot be applied to the term. 
Lemma 4.10. Every term of a decision theory has a tiniq*la uc repeat reducedform obtained 
by rewriting with the Repeat Reduction Lemma. 
Thus, if t is a term, the repeat reduced form may be denoted rpt( t). It is worth 
remarking that a simple thing which can be done to improve a decision tree :- *A 13 cu
repeat reduce it! One way, which is commonly used, 13 ;- to store the answers to the 
questions which have been ayaG c&-d. If a question occurs a second time, the previous 
answer is given again automati,,,., i dlv Anvone who has built a backward chaining, _ 
rule-based expert system will be familiar with using this technique in order to ensure 
that the decision tree, which is dynamically constructed by backward chaining, is 
repeat reduced. 
Let us return to the question of equality. Notice fust that all root paths of spines 
in a repeat reduce -d term are consistent. If t! and t2 are terms and we place a 
copy of t2 at each leaf of tl (equivalently, substitute every variable of tl by tz) to 
obtain tl/ t2, then, clearly, t,/ t2 cd t2 using idempotence. If the term il/ i2 is repeat 
reduced, then ih, q remnants of the term t2 at a leaf of rpt( tlJT which is reached by a 
root path P, can only have the variables Ret(&PY tz) occurring after that leaf. If 
tl = tzt then Ret(&P, t2 j is a singleton set containing the variable at that leaf of t, . 
This means that the remnant of t2, at a leaf of tl , has, at every leaf, the variable 
which was at that leaf of t, * So it can thew be reduced to that variable using 
idempotence. 
-._-- -A-_-A ^_^^ IBefirritioar 4.11. A term of a decision theory is said to be in i&myurrnr r&~d 
form if there is no LWV~~.-__ _ ------ation which can be eliminated by a use of the idempotence 
law. 
unique idenqpoten t reduced ,form 
If t is a term, the idempotent reduced form of t is denoted idp( tj. 
3. In a decision coalgebra, t, is [ -31 equivalent o :2 bf and 
only if 
idp(rpt( t, j f2)) = i 
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roof. Repeat reducing ?l/ 22, if ?l =d 2, t will result in rpt(t,) with remnants of fz 
at its leaves. By the above discussion these remnants can be idempotent reduced, 
thus it is clear that idp(rpt( t,/ f2)) = idp(rpt( tl)). 
Conversely if idp(rpt( t, / t2)) = idp(rpt( t,)) then, as the L S equals t2 by idem- 
potence, tl = d t2 is easily obtained. 0 
This allows the equality of d&Go n expressions to be decided by applying 
rewritings to the exprLJsions tl/t2 and il. Repeat reduction performed simul- 
taneously with idempotent reduction does not necessarily result in a unique term 
as the resulting rewriting system is not confluent. However, the form obtained by 
a repeat reduction followed by an idempotent reduction is both repeat reduced and 
idempotent reduced. 
A term of a decision theory is said to be in simply reduced form if 
it is both idempotent reduced and repeat reduced. 
The usual way of obtaining a simply reduced form, as repeat reduction together 
with idempotent reduction is not confluent, is to apply repeat reduction jbllowed by 
idempotent reduction. The process of applying first a repeat reduction and then an 
idempotent reduction is called a simple reduction. 
.15. In a decision theory, if tl is simply reduced, then t2 is [ D.l]-[ D.31 
equivalent to t, if and only if idp(rpt(L,i tz)) = t, . 
Simple reduction is a simple procedure which can be applied to decision trees 
to improve their form. Considering the situation discussed below Lemma 4.10, in 
which a tree is formed dynamically by backward chaining on rules, what is the 
analogue of simple reduction? It is clear that this reduction step requires knowledge 
of the whole tree and thus there is no dynamic analogue. If prime rules are used 
(no unnecessary antecedents’ /, then one can guarantee the resulting dynamically 
formed tree will be simply reduced. However, this introduces other, more subtle, 
control problems discussed in [6]. 
uced in Section 4 all provide definite improvements on the form 
ecision trees. In e forms account for why the trees (3), ( 
ay be discounte as undesirable. owever, we now present an 
obvious that o e form is bztter than another yet the forms we 
ave developed do not rovide the reason. 
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.l. Suppose a man has three children: Mary and Susan, who have red 
hair, and Joan, who has brown hair. Susan always wears a dress, Joan sometimes 
does and Mary never does. A friend, who does not know his children, saw one of 
them at a party with his son. Here are two ways the father can identify the daughter: 
(1) wearing-dress: 
[yes s red-hair: 
[yes % SUSAN, 
no % JOAN], 
no % red-hair: 
iyes % MARY, 
no > JOAN]]; 
(2) red-hair: 
[yes -* wearing-dress: 
[yes * SUSAN, 
no * MARY], 
no % JOAN]. 
Noa‘ :e that these decision trees are both repeat and idempotent reduced and thus 
simply reduced. Yet it is clear %..=I L11 +hgt he second tree is the better of the two. Notice 
that if the Hurst tree is transposed, a simple reduction can be performed to obtain 
the second tree. This is a crucial observation. 
Transposition is an important identity for optimization, not because it improves 
the tree but precisely because it does not change the optimal properties of a tree. 
This is shown by the following result [3]. 
Proposition 5.2 (Chen and Ras’s Lemma). Two repeat reduced terms have bag 
equivalent spine sets if and only if they are transposition equivalent. 
Before proving this result it is worth explaining what bag equivalent spine sets 
are. Given any term t, in a decision theory one may form the set of spines of that 
term Sp(t). Two spine sets Sp( t!) and Sp( t2) are bag equivalent if there is an 
isomorphism between them such that every spine p(P, , x) of Sp( tl) is carried to a 
spine p( P2, x) of Sp( t2) such that P, and Pz are equivalent as bags. Being equivalent 
as bags means that, cxcepi for the ordering, they have precise@ the same branch 
instructions. Of course, when the terms are repeat reduced, then P, and Pz are 
equivalent as sets whenever they are equivalent as bags. 
f. As transposition clearly preserv 
ivalent trees are s 
which are not necessarily repeat reduced. 
Trre converse is a little more delicate and is facilitated by some preliminary 
observations. 
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ni A decision q is said to be semi-e~3,.v =qtiaI in a term t if it occurs in 
the root path of every spine. 
A decision 4 is at the root of an expression if W=q;(Wr;L*~W,). 
q is semi-essential in t if and only if there is a transpose t’ oft which hs 
If there exists such a transpose t’ = q . 0, . . . ‘t,), as spine set bag equivalence 
is preserved, it follows that q was semi-essential in t. Conversely, if q occurs ot”l 
every spine of $, then 
t = la’,, . (q. (WE.,’ . . . ‘WI.“)’ . . . ‘q. (w& . . . ’ wm,,!) 
where w, and Wi,j are composite expressions. Either w. is the identity (and thus q 
is already at the root) or we may use Corollary 3.5 to move it to the root. q 
roof of Propositdon .Z (continued ). Consider the first cooperation of the first term 
t,. It occurs in the root path of each spine and so is semi-essential. This means it 
is semi-essential in the second term I’.?. Thus t2 is transpose equivalent o a term t2’ 
with the same rtiot decision as the first term t,. 
If q is this root decision, then below an argument of q, which corresponds to a 
branch instruction q 0 a, arc the subterms tl[ q 0 a] and t2’[q 9 a]. The spine set 
of t,[q 0 a] is 
Sp(t,Cq 0 al) = {PK x)lP(k# 0 aPI, 4 (2 SPWl= 
They are obtained by removing the branch instruction q 0 a from those spines of 
tl for which it is the first element. As t2 is repeat reduced, 4 occurs exactly once in 
the q 0 a branch instruction from those spines of i2 containing 
spine set which is bag equivalent to Sp( t2’[q 0 a]) and 
1). Thus, t2’[q 0 a] and tl.[ q 0 a] have bag equivalent spine sets. 
e result is plainly true for trees of height one. But if tl and t2 are of height N, 
ng tke root decision as above will give trees at the arguments of height 
at most N - 1. Thus, by induction, the result is true for all trees. 0 
eat reduced, then it is quite possible that they 
yet fail to be transposition equivalent. This means 
that the requirement hat the terms are repeat reduced is necessary. 
teps required to complete the 
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A t~;,rm t is said to be irreducible if every transpose equivalent o t 
is simply reduced. 
In Example 5.1 it is clear that (1) is not irreducible while (2) is irreducible. This 
explains why the second form is better. 
Unfortunately, this is a ‘conceptual definition’ as it would clearly not be sensible 
to check that every transpose is actually simply reduced. The problem with this is 
that the number of transposes becomes extremely large very quick11 (for a binary 
tree v&h N decisions the worst case is given by the primitive recursive function 
r(N) defined by: 
r(0) = 1, r(N)= NxT(N-1)’ 
which is a worse than factorial explosion). Fortunately, there are more efficient 
ways of checking for irreducibility. These are described in [5,7]. 
In fact, in [5,7], a fuller explanation of why the irreducible forms are so important 
to the problem of optimization is given. In particular, it is shown in [7] that for 
every irreducible tree there is an expected testing-cost criterion which makes it an 
optimal one. Intuitively, this says that every irreducible tree is an optimal tree for 
SOme problem. This means that if one cannot provide information about the form 
of the cost criterion, one cannot guarantee to do better than to choose an irreducible. 
In practice one very rarely has a precisely specified cost criterion so that this is a 
valuable result. 
In [7], an algorithm for ‘reducing’ a tree to an irreducible one is describe& The 
irreducible tree to which a tree is reduced by this algorithm has the useful property 
that it is always no less e%cient than the original tree. 
In [lo], an algorithm is described for l;t;l~V._C~ t -~=~r~~%g all the irreducible forms of a 
given tree. The main difficulty of this algorithm is to avoid the generation of 
transposes of irreducibles already generated so that one always obtains a significantly 
different form. While it is possible for a term to have a unique irreducible form, 
more often, there are a large number of irreducibles. 
The identities [D.l]-[ D.31 introduced in Section 3 were intro 
justification. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full justification 
(such a justification is the main subject of [a]), it is possible to show fairly easily 
that these identities are complete and consistent. 
To show consistency, it suffices to find a nontrivial coalgebra which satisfies 
.3]. For completeness, it is su 
that every identity th& it satisfies is a consequence 
coalgebra is nontrivial, then, in the course of proving completeness, consistency 
will have been obtained. 
J. R. 3. Cocke:t 
Let D = (Q, { }) be a decision theory. Consider the set 
bity(Q) = II Ia~OWl, 
945Q 
the product of the arity sets of the decisions. The elements of this set can be 
represented by lists of branch instructions: 
For each qi E Q we may define a cooperation on Arity( Q) by 
(qi):Arity(Q)+Arity(Q)+* l l +A&y(Q); 
[. . . , qi 0 ai,. . .]c*[-. qi 0 ai,. . l ] . bai 
where the :zopy number ai in the coproduct embedding is determined by the argument 
number associated with the qi branch instruction. 
ma 63, Arity( Q) ?oge?!rer with the cooperations A( qi) form a decision coulgebra 
of ~=(Q,{ 1). 
f. It is necessary to check that [ D.I]-[ D.31 hold. For [ 0.11, the interpretation 
ofA(qi).<X’...’ X) = x is A( qi) . (i(-)’ . . G ‘i(-)) = i(-). Considering the effect of this 
map on any element gives 
hOa,,--., qn 0 a,]. A(qi) . (i(-)’ . . . ‘i(-)) 
. =[41Oa,,..., qn 0 a’,] . b,.+ .(i( -)’ . . . ‘i( -)) 
=[9~0ah-..,qnOa,l 
skewing that it is the identity map and thus the identity holds. For [D.2], the 
interpretation is 
It suffices to check that the effect of the two sides on any element of A&y(Q) is 
the same. For the L S note that if the ranch instruction in an element for qi is 
qi 0 Qi, where Qi is not r + 1, then the effect is 
t is easy now to check that the RWS has the same effect. If Qi is r+ 1, thei the 
S is 
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Thus Arity( Q) is an example of a nontrivial coalgebra which gives consistency. 
However, this coalgebra has another important property. Suppose two expressio:.s 
are equal in this coalgebra so that both have the same effect on every element; then, 
when both expressions are transformed into full normal form, they must have the 
same effect on the elements. Each element is, however, a path in the full normal 
form and evaluating the elemenr simply picks off the variable at the corresponding 
leaf. Thus, if the effect on each element is the same, the full normal forms must be 
the same. Thus the original expressions must be [D.l]-[D.3] equivalent. 
This gives our final result. 
Theorem 6.2 (The completeness and consistency of [DA]-[D.3]). Given a decision 
theory D = (Q, { }), there ta a nontrivial decision coalgebra. Furthermore an identity 
tl = t2 is satisfied by every decision coalgebra if and only if it can be derived from 
[D.l]-[D.3]. 
The importance of this result is that one can handle decision trees precisely as if 
they were algebraic entities using [D. l]-[ D.31. 
It should be stressed that the completeness and consistency of coalgebraic theories 
is not a conseque nce of Birkoff’s theorems for algebraic varieties. The reason for 
this is that the forcing of an identity on a coalgebra may actually introduce further 
identities which are not algebraic consequences of the original identity. This situation 
is described in more detail in [4], where the completeness for arbitrary decision 
theories is also proven. 
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